FEDERAL TAXATION: GIFT TO MINOR HELD A PRESENT
INTEREST QUALIFYING FOR SECTION 2503 (c)
GIFT TAX EXCLUSION DESPITE STATE LAWS
RESTRICTING PRESENT ENJOYMENT
Due to the difficulty of qualifying for the annual exclusion under
section 2503, while avoiding the conferral of complete control of
the property to an inexperienced minor, Congress passed section
2503(c). However, the efficacy of this section for estate planning
was limited by its ambiguity and the Treasury's interpretation.
The recent case of Ross v. United States has clarified to a certain
extent the meaning of the criteria established by section 2503(c)
and has, at least partially, rejected the Treasury's interpretation.
In so doing, it has contributed to the usefulness of this section as
a workable tool in estate planning.

SECTION 2503 (b) of the Internal Revenue Code provides that a
donor who conveys a present interest to a donee may exclude the
first 3,000 dollars of that gift from the amount subject to gift tax.'
Under that provision, however, it has been difficult to convey a gift
to a minor which would qualify for this exclusion and at the same
I Section 2503 (b) states that "in the case of gifts (other than gifts of future interests
in property) made to any person by the donor .. ., the first $3,000 of such gifts ...
shall not, for purposes of subsection (a), be included in the total amount of gifts
made during such year." INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2503 (b). (Emphasis added.)
Definitions of present interests and future interests are found in the regulations
as follows:
a) "'Future interests' is a legal term . . . [denoting interests] which are limited to
commence in use, possession or enjoyment at some future date or time.
b) "An unrestricted right to the immediate use, possession, or enjoyment of property
or the income from property . . . is a present interest in property." Treas. Reg.

25.2503-3 (1958).

See also Ashcraft v. Allen, 90 F. Supp. 543, 545 (M.D. Ga. 1950), for a discussion
of present and future interests.
In Helvering v. Hutchings, 312 U.S. 393, 396-97 (1941), the Court held that where
gifts are placed in trust, the beneficiary, not the trustee, is the donee under the
statutory phrase "any person." INT. REV. CODE OF 1932, § 504 (b), 47 Stat. 247 (now
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2503 (b)). As a result, the donor can receive as many exclusions as there are beneficiaries. Thus, the donor can receive a $3,000 exclusion
($5,000 at time of Helvering v. Hutchings, supra) for each donee and take advantage
of the provision each year. Furthermore, each spouse may take advantage of the
annual exclusion, making it possible to grant annually a $6,000 tax-free gift to each
beneficiary. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2513.
See generally LOWNDES & KRAMER, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXES, § 33 (2d ed.
1962); 5 MERmENS, ILAw OF FEDERAL GIFT AND ESTATE TAXATION, §§ 38.01-.38 (1959);
Caplin, How to Treat Gifts to Minors, N.Y.U. l3TH INST. ON FED. TAX 193 (1955);
Ehrlich, Tax Aspects of Gifts to Minors, 46 MASS. L.Q. 310 (1961); Louthan, Trusts for
Minors, Trust Bull., Oct. 1955, p. 24.
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time contain restrictions on present enjoyment which, are sufficient
to guarantee proper management during the donee's minority. 2
To ameliorate this problem, section 2503 (c) was added in 1954 and
provides that a gift to a minor may be accorded present interest
status despite fetters upon the use and enjoyment of the property
prior to majority.3 Specifically, the statute provides that a gift will
not be considered a future interest if it "may be expended by, or
for ...

the donee" before he reaches age twenty-one. The recent

case of Ross v. United States4 ruled upon the ambiguities latent in
this proviso,5 and represents the first judicial attempt to clarify the
"may be expended" criteria for a qualifying gift to a minor.
Ross involved the question of whether three identical gifts, made
in the form of trusts in favor of minor donees, qualified for the
exclusion under section 2503 (c). The terms of the trusts provided
that the trustees should have power to distribute income from the
trust corpus, and that the corpus and any undistributed income
should be distributed to the donees upon their attaining the age of
twenty-one. In addition, the trustees were expressly authorized to
exercise all powers conferred upon a guardian under the laws of the
cestuis' respective domiciles, which in this case involved the laws of
Texas." No explicit authorization to invade the corpus was granted,
"Gifts to minors are often hindered by the fact that it is not clear how such a
gift can be made in trust or through a guardian . . .other than as a future interest,
and for future interests the $3,000 exclusion is not available." S. REP. No. 1622, 83d
Cong., 2d Sess. 127 (1954).
3 Section 2503 (c) qualifies the future interest exception by providing that "no part
of a gift to an individual who has not attained the age of 21 years on the date of
such transfer shall be considered a gift of a future interest in property for purposes of
subsection (b) if the property and the income therefrom-(1) may be expended by, or
for the benefit of, the donee before his attaining the age of 21 years, and (2) will to
the extent not so expended (A) pass to the donee on his attaining the age of 21 years,
and (B) in the event the donee dies before attaining the age of 21 years, be payable
to the estate of the donee or as he may appoint under a general power of appointment
as defined in section 2514 (c)." INT. RaV. CODE OF 1954, § 2503 (c). (Emphasis added.)
If a gift does not qualify under § 2503 (c), it still may be a present interest entitled
to the exclusion under § 2503 (b). S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 127, 478 (1954).
See also LOWNDES & KRAMER, op. cit. supra note 1, § 33.11; Lentz, How to Draft a
Trust for a Minor, 95 TRuSTS & ESTATES 12, 14-15 (1956). However, the donor is well
advised to structure the terms of the gift in such a manner as to bring it within
the specific terms of § 2503 (c) to avert the uncertainties of a judicial definition of
"present interest." See Norvell, Section 2503(c) Trusts, 10 BAYLOR L. RaV. 29, 32 (1958).
'348 F.2d 577 (5th Cir. 1965).
The major ambiguity is whether restrictions upon the expenditure of the trust
property and income, imposed by the donor or the state, will disqualify the donor for
the exclusion by some restrictive interpretation of the words "may be expended"
within § 2503 (c).
0 348 F.2d at 578. All the beneficiaries were domiciled in Texas and were not
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but under Texas law a guardian may obtain a court order authorizing invasion of the corpus of his ward's estate for the latter's main7
tenance and education.
The Commissioner contended that the exclusion should be disallowed because the gifts did not meet the "may be expended"
requisite of section 2503 (c) (1).8 He argued that the trust provision
investing the trustees with Texas guardianship powers was insufficient to make the corpus property a gift which "may be expended
for the benefit of the minor"9 because of the restrictions imposed
by state law upon a guardian's power to invade corpus. 10 The Commissioner urged that these restrictions upon discretionary expenditures by the trustees were "substantial" within the meaning of the
regulations, 1 thereby disqualifying the gift under section 2503 (c).
The Fifth Circuit rejected the Commissioner's contention and
stated that the restrictions imposed by state law upon a guardian's
expected to move. In any event, the powers of a guardian, as well as the restrictions
placed upon him, are substantially similar in most states. See notes 7, 30 infra.
7 There are three restrictions which Texas case law imposes upon a guardian's
power to invade corpus. First, expenditures may not be made from the minor's

estate unless the parents are financially unable to maintain and educate that child.
Second, such expenditures may be made only for the child's education and maintenance.

Third, these expenditures may be made only upon obtaining a court order, except in
cases of emergency. 348 F.2d at 579. See also Logan v. Gay, 99 Tex. 603 (1903);
Pemberton v. Leatherwood, 218 S.W.2d 500 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949). A Texas statute

permits invasions of the corpus by the guardian where the net income of the minor's
estate is insufficient to provide for his education and maintenance. 'rEx. PROD. CODE
§ 236 (a) (Supp. 1964).
A careful reading of the Texas statute reveals that the restrictions apply solely to
the corpus of a gift. The court might have interpreted § 2503 (c) as did the court
in Axlean I. Herr, 35 T.C. 732 (1961), afJ'd, 202 F.2d 780 (3d Cir. 1962), and granted the
donor an exclusion only for the income portion of the gift since there were no restrictions upon the trustees' discretion to distribute income. The objection to this
result would be that "property and income" must meet the requirement of "may be
expended," so that if "property" may not be expended, there can be no exclusion whatsoever. However, in Herr, the court ruled that even though there is no possibility
that corpus or property may be expended, the exclusion will be available if "income"
may be expended. Thus, Herr interpreted "property and income" to mean income
and the income therefrom.
Due to the fact that the Ross court does not consider the possibility of granting an
exclusion solely for the income portion of the gift, Ross might be read as a rejection
of the Herr analysis of § 2503 (c).
8 See note 3 supra.
9 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2503 (c) (1).
103 48 F.2d at 581. See note 7 supra.
"Brief for Defendant, pp. 8-9.
The regulations state that a gift will qualify under § 2503 (c) even though the determination of the amounts and the purpose of the expenditures is left to the discretion
of the trustee, ".... provided there are no substantialrestrictionsunder the terms of the
Treas. Reg. § 25.2503-4
trust instrument on the exercise of such discretion ......
(1958). (Emphasis added.)
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power to invade the corpus should not preclude the availability of
the exclusion under section 2503 (c). 1 2 The pivotal statutory lan-

guage, "may be expended,"' 13 was interpreted by the court to mean
"may be expended within the limitations imposed on guardians by
state law."'I4
Section 2503 (c) was ostensibly enacted in order to make it possible
for a donor to realize the 3,000 dollar annual exclusion while at the
same time conveying a gift to a minor containing restrictions on expenditures which are adequate to guarantee prudent management.' 5
Prior to the enactment of this provision, substantial confusion existed
as to how a donor could qualify for the exclusion without giving the
minor control over the property.' 6 The need for congressional action
became compelling following the holding of the Supreme Court in
Fondrenv. Commissioner,"'where it was asserted that a gift in trust,
which was to be distributed to the minor donee only if an emergency
indicated a need for such distribution, could not be considered a gift
of a present interest. The Court stated that a gift is not of a present
interest if any circumstances operate to restrict the donee's ability
to presently enjoy the gift.'
In decisions subsequent to Fondren, a conflict developed as to
the criteria which should govern the question of whether a gift
constitutes a present interest for purposes of section 2503 (b). In
12 348 F.2d at 581.

1"See note 3 supra.
1"348 F.2d at 579.
'1"Almost in vain, the donors sought for a magic formula for making a gift in
trust, particularly for the benefit of minors, which would pass the 'future interest'
hurdle and at the same time avoid the donor's natural reluctance to vest full control
of the property and the income in immature and inexperienced donees.
"In response to this widespread ... dissatisfaction and the accompanying demands
for clarifying legislation, Congress . .. adopted section 2503 (c) .... Lentz, Drafting
a Section 2503(c) Trust for a Minor, 38 DicTA 11, 12-13 (1961).
Congress recognized the problem which a donor faced in conveying a restricted
gift which would qualify for the exclusion when it stated that "doubt arises as to
whether a gift in trust for a minor can be a present interest since the child does not
presently have complete control over the property." H. R. REP.No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d

Sess. 93 (1954). The report's discussion of § 2503 (c) implies that the provision was enacted to make it possible to convey a gift which would qualify for the exclusion without
granting an inexperienced minor "complete control over the property." Ibid.
16Compare John w. Kieckhefer, 15 T.C. 111, 112 (1950), rev'd, 189 F.2d 118, 120
(7th Cir. 1951), with Fondren v. Commissioner, 324 U.S. 18 (1945).
"324 U.S. 18 (1945).
IsId. at 24-25. "The question is of time, not when title vests, but when enjoyment begins. Whatever puts the barrier of a substantial period between the will of
the beneficiary or donee now to enjoy what has been given him and that enjoyment
makes the gift one of a future interest .... Id. at 20-21 (dictum). (Emphasis added.)
See Commissioner v. Disston, 325 U.S. 442, 447-49 (1945).
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one case involving a gift in trust to a minor which the beneficiary
under the terms of the trust could terminate at any time, the Second
Circuit held that the minor's incapacity under state law to make
an effective demand for the property prevented the gift from being
a present interest. 19 However, the Seventh Circuit, on identical
facts, held that the minor received a present interest despite state
law restricting his ability to demand the donated property. 20 The
court reasoned that if a donor conveys as complete an interest as
is possible under state law, he should receive the exclusion
notwithstanding the inability of the beneficiary to physically enjoy or
possess the gift property.2 '
In addition to the possibility that state law would prevent the
creation of a present interest, it has also been held that a future
interest was conveyed where the beneficiary's present enjoyment
of the gift depended upon any contingency required by the terms
of the gift itself. 22 Thus, if the trustee were granted the power to use
19Stifel v. Commissioner, 197 F.2d 107 (2d Cir. 1952). The court stated that "it is
urged that neither the Tax Court nor we may properly consider these items, since

they involve restrictions not contained in the trust instrument ....

But in Fondren

v. Commissioner, 324 U.S. 18, 24 [ (1945) . .. and Commissioner v. Disston, 825 U.S.
442, 449 [(1945)] ....
the Supreme Court, in determining the nature of the rights
conferred by the trust instruments, took account of 'surrounding circumstances'; the
court, in reaching its determinations, did not irrevocably lock itself inside the 'four
corners' of the writings but held that the key might lie outside. Were this not the
rule, a donor could make gifts which on paper were 100% present but in practice were
100% future." Stifel v. Commissioner, supra at 110. Cf. William H. Pope, 12 P-H Tax
Ct. Mem. 646 (1953); Rev. Rul. 54-91, 1954-1 (Cum. BULL. 207).
See generally 5 MmRTENs, op. cit. supra note 1, § 88.19; Forbes, Gifts to Minors, 19
MONT. L. REv. 106, 108 (1958).
20 Kieckhefer v. Commissioner, 189 F.2d 118 (7th Cir. 1951).
2
"Id. at 121. In Kieckhefer, the court made a distinction between restrictions imposed by the donor himself upon the minor's ability to enjoy the property, and those
imposed by state law. If the donor has conveyed a present interest within the "four
corners" of the trust instrument, he should receive the annual exclusion, notwithstanding "outside" state restrictions peculiar to minors which would prevent
the actual enjoyment of the gift. The court based its decision on the theory that to
hold otherwise would be to make an unreasonable distinction between minors and
adults since the same gift would have been a present interest if conveyed to an adult,
given the absence of state restrictions. Id. at 121-22.
See Gilmore v. Commissioner, 213 F.2d 520 (6th Cir. 1954); Commissioner v. Sharp,
158 F.2d 168 (9th Cir. 1946); Strekalovsky v. Delaney, 78 F. Supp. 556 (D. Mass. 1948);
accord, United States v. Baker, 236 F.2d 817 (4th Cir. 1956); Cannon v. Robertson, 98
F. Supp. 831 (W.D.N.C. 1951); Beatrice B. Briggs, 34 T.C. 1132 (1960).
See also 5 MERTENS, op. cit. supra note 1, § 88.19, at 511; Forbes, supra note 19,
at 108.
22 Street v. Commissioner, 261 F.2d 666 (5th Cir. 1958) (beneficiaries not to receive
corpus unless need arises); Commissioner v. Phillips' Estate, 126 F.2d 851 (5th Cir.
1942) (beneficiaries' enjoyment contingent upon death of donor or lapse of ten years);
Elise McK. Morgan, 42 T.C. 1080 (1964) (trustee to expend gift only for health,

Vol. 1966: 578]

FEDERAL TAXATION

his discretion in distributing the donative property, the exclusion
would be denied as to the property subject to the trustee's discretion.
As a result of these decisions, a prospective donor of a gift to
a minor was presented with a dilemma. Under the "actual enjoyment" test of the Fondren case, it appeared that the only certain
method of creating a present interest in a minor donee was to make
an outright gift. 23 This method has the distinct disadvantage of
placing an often substantial sum in the hands of an immature donee.
The alternative was to delay distribution to an age when the donee
would be better able to manage the property, thereby creating a
24
future interest and losing the exclusion.
In enacting section 2503 (c), Congress seemingly recognized the
dilemma which a donor faced in placing necessary restrictions
upon a gift to a minor while attempting to gain the exclusion by
maintenance or education); William Goehner, 28 T.C. 542 (1957) (trustees to expend
gift only if parents could not support or educate beneficiaries).
S'There were some authorities who disputed that even an outright gift to a
minor would constitute a present interest. Fleming, A Different View of Outright
Gifts to Minors, 7 TAX L. REv. 89 (1953); Fleming, Gifts for the Benefit of Minors,
49 MicH. L. REV. 529 (1951). Other writers regarded the question as unsettled. Anderson, Gifts to Children and Incompetents, 26 TAxEs 911 (1948). Diamond, Tops and
Dolls-or Gifts to Minors, 30 TAxEs 987 (1952). There was, however, substantial
authority for the position that an outright gift to a minor would be a present interest.
Edward J. Kelly, 19 T.C. 27 (1952); Madelaine N. Sharp, 3 T.C. 1062 (1944), aff'd,
153 F.2d 163 (9th Cir. 1946); Chas. F. Roeser, 2 T.C. 298 (1943). Each of these cases
involved gifts to a minor through a guardian. Of course, this method would have
solved the problem of management implicit in actually placing the property in the
hands of the minor. However, it was not until 1954 that the Treasury finally acquiesced
in the holdings that an outright gift to a minor through a guardian is a present
interest. Rev. Rul. 54-400, 1954-2 GuM. BULL. 319.
Thus, an outright gift to a minor through a guardian represents a method by
which a donor can gain the annual exclusion and still avert the problem of management implicit in an outright gift to the minor himself. However, the use of a guardian
is expensive and cumbersome. See Caplin, supra note 1, at 201.
s' For example, in United States v. Pelzer, 312 U.S. 399 (1941), the trust instrument provided for a mandatory accumulation of the corpus and income and the
Court held that the minor had received a future interest.
However, a means of partially circumventing this dilemma was devised in
Sensenbrenner v. Commissioner, 134 F.2d 883 (7th Cir. 1943), and in Fisher v. Commissioner, 132 F.2d 383 (9th Cir. 1942). In these two cases the trustee was directed to
distribute income to the beneficiary, but was not permitted to make any distribution
of the corpus until the beneficiary matured. Sensenbrenner v. Commissioner, supra
at 884; Fisher v. Commissioner, supra at 384. In both cases it was held that a present
interest had been conveyed in the income portion of the gift, but that the beneficiary
had received a future interest in the corpus. The obvious advantage of this method
is that a donor receives an exclusion for at least part of the gift while avoiding the
distribution of a large sum to a minor who is not equipped to manage it, although
the distribution of the largest part of the gift is postponed until the minor has
matured.
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creating a present interest. 25 The problem was eased by making
the exclusion available if the formulae prescribed by section 2503 (c)
were followed. 26 That new section does not require distribution
of the trust corpus to a minor, but demands only that the instrument
provide for a possible expenditure of the "property and income
27
therefrom."
However, section 2503 (c) did not solve the problem of whether
2

1See note 15 supra.
26 See note 3 supra.
27 Treas. Reg. § 25.2503-4 (1958); S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 127, 479
(1954).
The Senate report concerning § 2503 (c) states that "it is not necessary that the
property or income be actually expended by or for the benefit of a minor during
minority .... " S. RP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 479 (1954).
However, there are difficulties under § 2503 (c) which do not exist with § 2503 (b).
It is possible under the latter section to defer distribution of a large corpus until the
beneficiary attains a more mature age than twenty-one, the traditional demarcation
between majority and minority, and still gain the benefit of the exclusion in relation
to income by providing for a mandatory distribution of the latter. See note 24 supra.
It may not be possible to employ this beneficial scheme under § 2503 (c), as the provision seems to require a complete distribution of both "property and income therefrom" at age twenty-one if any remains undistributed at that time. See note 3 supra.
See also LOWNDES & KRAMER, op. cit. supra note 1, § 33.10, at 721. If "property and
income therefrom" are to be interpreted as corpus and income, then the total sum of
the donated property must be distributed to the beneficiary at an age when he or
she may not in fact be fully capable of managing such a sum. Section 2503 (c) does
not afford the exclusive method of making such gifts, however, and does not preclude
the use of the "Sensenbrenner-Fischer" trust under § 2503 (b), in which the trustee is
required to distribute income but must wait until the beneficiary has matured before a
distribution of corpus can occur. Of course, there is an advantage under § 2503 (c)
which does not exist if the trust is to qualify under § 2503 (b), namely that the donor
does not have to require a mandatory distribution under § 2503 (c). Therefore, sub.
stitution of the "Sensenbrenner-Fischer" trust for a § 2503 (c) trust is not as advantageous as the latter. See note 24 supra.
The recent case of Arlean I. Herr, 35 T.C. 732 (1961), aff'd, 303 F.2d 780 (3d Cir.
1962), may provide a method whereby a donor will be able to obtain the exclusion
under § 2503 (c) for the income portion of the gift while avoiding the undesirable
implications of distributing a large sum to an immature person. In Herr, the trustee
was empowered to distribute income if he thought it prudent, but was directed to
distribute corpus at age thirty. The Commissioner contended that the gift failed to
qualify as a present interest under § 2503 (c) because under that section both corpus
and income must be available to the minor at age twenty-one. 35 T.C. at 735. The
court overruled the Commissioner and held that the word "property" in § 2503 (c) is
not equivalent to corpus, but means "the totality of elements that go to make up the
entire gift that is being considered for classification as a present interest." Id. at 736.
Thus, the phrase "property and income therefrom" was held to mean income and the
income therefrom.
As a result of the Herr case, a donor may be able to take advantage of §
2503 (c) in respect to income and still defer payment of corpus to the minor until
he reaches a mature age, or defer payment of corpus completely and have it revert
back to him at an age when he may need this property and when his income tax
bracket is lower. Accord, Carl E. Weller, 38 T.C. 790 (1962); Jacob Konner, 35 T.C.
727 (1961).
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or not certain legal disabilities, such as a state's legal restrictions
upon a guardian's power to invade corpus, preclude a donor from
qualifying for the exclusion. Although stipulating that, in addition
to other requirements, a present gift to a minor must provide that
property and income "may be expended, ' 28 Congress did not specify
in the text of the statute whether any impediment to such expenditure would be disqualifying, or whether a slight possibility of such
expenditure would qualify. The Commissioner has interpreted
"may be expended" as precluding the existence of "substantial
restrictions" upon the trustee's discretion to distribute the property
and income of the gift.29 Under this interpretation, it would appear
that restrictions which states place upon the capacity of minors or the
discretion of guardians might continue to prevent many gifts to
minors from qualifying as gifts of present interests. 30
The Ross case, in interpreting the words "may be expended" to
mean "may be expended within the limitations imposed on guardians
by state law,"3 1 seemingly repudiates the regulation's interpretation
of section 2503 (c). Without mention of whether the restrictions
imposed by Texas law constituted substantial restrictions,3 2 the
court stated that state restrictions should not prevent an otherwise
present interest from qualifying for the exclusion. 33 This result
would appear sound since Congress seems to have intended that
gifts to minors through guardians or trustees could qualify for the
exclusion under section 2503 (c).34 If the Commissioner's contention
28 See note 3 supra.
29 Treas.

Reg. § 25.2503-4 (b) (1958).

80 For examples of some of the restrictions which states impose upon the invasion
of trust property, see CAL. PROB. CODE § 1504; MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 21, § 41 (1955);
NJ. STAT. ANN. § 3A: 20-1 (1953). The New Jersey statute is typical of other state
statutes. It provides that the guardian must obtain court permission to invade corpus
for support and education, and will be able to do so only when the income from the
corpus is insufficient and the minor has no other proper means of support and education.
81 348 F.2d at 579.
82 Although the court did not decide whether the Texas restrictions were within
the Commissioner's definition of "substantial restrictions," it seems fair to assume that
they were since the Commissioner argued to that effect in his brief. See Brief for
Appellee, p. 9.
33 348 F.2d at 581.
8"The Senate report concerning § 2503 (c) stated that "gifts to minors are often
hindered by the fact that it is not clear how such a gift can be made in trust or
through a guardian . . . other than as a future interest . . . . The House and your
Committee's bill provides that gifts to minors will not be considered gifts of future
interest if the income and property can be spent by or for the child prior to his attaining the age of 21." S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 127 (1954). (Emphasis
added.)
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had been adopted, virtually all gifts made through the ordinary
type of guardianship would have been disqualified because all
states impose essentially similar restrictions upon guardians8 5
As a result of the Ross decision, state restrictions in the Fifth Circuit
will no longer impose a barrier to a gift meeting the qualifications
of section 2503 (c).
The Ross case may be susceptible to an additional interpretation.
Although the Fifth Circuit did not allude to the point, the reference
within the trust instrument to "the laws of the domicile of the
beneficiary" 36 was ostensibly a shorthand method of imposing upon
the trustees the restrictions which Texas law places upon guardians.
Since this incorporation by reference could have been accomplished
with the same efficacy by enumerating these restrictions, the holding
may have necessarily established that any restrictions explicitly
stated within the trust instrument which do not exceed the limitations of state guardianship law will not compel a denial of the
exclusion under section 2503 (c).37
By referring to the creation of gifts through a trustee or a guardian, the Senate
seems to imply that § 2503 (c) is designed to permit the creation of a gift either in
trust or through a guardian, which will qualify for the exclusion. A trustee who is
accorded protective powers over the trust res is serving essentially the same function
as a guardian with respect to such property, and the correlation of guardian and
trustee by Congress would thus appear to be consistent and desirable. State law
limitations upon the two capacities may vary, however.
35 348 F.2d at 581; see note 30 supra.
36348 F.2d at 578.
37 There is another possible interpretation to the case. The court stated that "may
be expended" means "may be expended within the limitations imposed on guardians
by state law," thus implying that the donor himself had not placed these restrictions
upon the guardian. 348 F.2d at 579. Viewed in this manner, Ross may be more
restrictively interpreted as standing only for the obvious proposition that restrictions
imposed by state law will not prevent a gift from qualifying under § 2503 (c) if the
donor makes it clear that the trustee can, if he desires, invade corpus and income for
the benefit of the donee. This narrower perspective would still leave in doubt the
status of a gift in which the donor explicitly enumerated, within the instrument, the
same restrictions which state law places upon guardians and/or trustees.
However, the possibility that a different result would occur if the donor enumerated
the same restrictions within the trust instrument as were placed upon the guardians
by Texas law is doubtful in light of Helvering v. Helmholz, 296 U.S. 93 (1935).
Under existing tax law, as well as at the time of the Helmholz decision, a transfer
which is subject at the date of death of the transferor to any change through the
exercise of a power to alter, amend or revoke the transfer, either by the decedent
himself, or with any person, is taxable to the transferor's estate. INT. RIEV. CODE OF
1936, § 2038. See also INT. REV. CODE OF 1924, § 302 (d).
In Helmholz, the trust instrument stated that the settlor and all the beneficiaries
could terminate the trust. 296 U.S. at 94-96. The government contended that this
provision made the corpus taxable to the settior's estate. Id. at 97. The Court rejected this contention, reasoning that local law permits all the interested parties to
terminate the trust and this local law does not make the trust revocable. Ibid. There-
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In clarifying the meaning of the statutory phrase "may be expended," the Fifth Circuit has significantly enhanced the utility
of section 2503 (c). That section, which was apparently enacted to
provide a method whereby a restricted gift to a minor could also
38
qualify for the annual exclusion granted by section 2503 (b),
has not in reality been an effective provision for the practitioner
because of the uncertainty inherent in the phrase "may be expended."8 9 By providing an interpretation of the statutory phrase
which is susceptible of reliable application, Ross has, at least in the
Fifth Circuit, made section 2503 (c) a workable tool of estate
planning.
fore, the explicit reservation of a power, since it adds nothing to what the trust law
already permits, does not make the trust revocable.
The case seems to stand for the proposition that the explicit mention of a power
or duty which already exists under local law does not alter the tax status of a trust.
Thus, it would seem that if a donor explicitly restricted the guardians by the terms
of the trust instrument in the same way as did local law, the tax result would not
be different because these restrictions are part of every trust instrument involving
guardians due to local law.
See
also LOWNDS S: KRAMER, op. cit. supra note 1, § 9.3, at 164-65.
8
See note 15 supra.
80 348 F.2d at 579.

